The media often cast foreign private equity firms as villains who gamble with local jobs. We use detailed registry data from Sweden to show that foreign buyouts have not affected workers' labor market outcomes. But domestic buyouts have. They have increased unemployment incidence by a fifth, duration by a third, and lowered labor income by seven percent.
Introduction
Acquisitions by foreign private equity (PE) firms are common. Baziki et al. (2017) report that more than eight percent of all cross-border acquisitions between 1998 and 2010 were by financial buyers. The media and politicians often cast foreign PE firms as villains who gamble with local jobs. For example, the head of the German Social Democratic Party, Franz
Müntefering, called PE firms "swarms of locusts" who "descend on companies, graze, and then move on" (Bena et al., 2017) . There are reasons to expect that foreign PE firms could be more aggressive towards workers than domestic PE firms. Foreign PE firms have no local reputation to care for, and they may specialize in foreign rather than domestic expansion. But there are also reasons to expect that domestic buyouts could be bad for workers. Domestic PE firms might have superior knowledge on how to circumvent local labor market regulations to cut costs. They might also pursue a strategy of market consolidation and thus merge local firms with overlapping assets and workers.
In this article, we use Swedish matched employer-employee data to study the labor market outcomes of workers following foreign and domestic buyouts. We follow workers for nine years around the buyout and compare them to workers in similar firms that are not buyout targets. We show using differences-in-differences (DiD) regressions that foreign buyouts have not affected unemployment incidence, duration, or annual labor income of workers. But domestic buyouts have. They have increased unemployment incidence by a fifth, duration by a third, and lowered labor income by seven percent. Triple difference models show statistically significant relative differences in unemployment incidence and annual labor income, but not in unemployment duration.
The literature on the employment effects of buyouts has found mixed effects on net employment at the firm level. There is growth following buyouts in France (Boucly et al., 2011) , and small declines or no effects following buyouts in the U.K. and the U.S. (Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Wright et al., 1992; Amess and Wright, 2010; Davis et al., 2014) . At the individual level, Agrawal and Tambe (2016) document positive effects on IT related workers in the US; Antoni et al. (2017) find mixed effects on workers in Germany; and Olsson and Tåg (2017) show that workers performing routine or offshorable job tasks in low productive firms tend to get laid off. These papers do not distinguish between the foreign status of the PE firm. Baziki et al. (2017) investigate theoretically the determinants of strategic buyers versus financial buyers in cross-border acquisitions, and Guery et al. (2017) use French data to show that establishment-level employment is lower following buyouts by foreigners compared to buyouts by French PE firms.
Our paper builds on and uses the same dataset as Olsson and Tåg (2017) and is the first to investigate the effects of PE buyouts on workers using individual-level data and separating by foreign status. Firm-level studies provide insights on net employment changes. But there is little evidence on what happens to employed workers. This is because zero net effects could hide considerable churn. Our paper thus is the first to speak directly to the concerns about existing workers expressed by politicians and the media.
Data and empirical strategy
This article uses the same data, empirical strategy, and samples as Olsson and Tåg (2017) . The data comes from Sweden, which has one of the most active PE markets in Europe (Lerner et al., 2008 To deal with selection concerns, we use propensity score matching combined with DiD regressions. Matching gives us a control group of workers in firms that look like the firms that are buyout targets. The DiD design controls for unobserved time-invariant group effects and common time effects. We match PE target firms to control firms using one-to-one matching without replacement. Olsson and Tåg (2017) detail the matching procedure and how well it works (we use the same set of controls).
Analysis and results
Table 1 displays the distribution of buyouts by foreign status across industries. Foreign buyouts are more common in the transport, mail, and telecommunications industry as well as in the education, health, and social work sector. In unreported unconditional mean comparisons, we found that foreign PE firms tend to target firms that are larger, younger, has lower leverage, has fewer routine workers, fewer offshorable workers, and that has more skilled workers. There are no observable differences in value added per employee, return on assets, or prior size growth. Figure 1 shows trends in unemployment and annual labor income of workers around the buyout announcement. Because all workers work at time zero, the pre-trends are decreasing in unemployment and increasing in labor income. But key is that the pre-trends for the treated workers resemble those of the control workers for all outcomes.
After the buyout announcement, unemployment is higher and labor income lower for the treated workers part of domestic buyouts relative to their controls. This is not the case for workers that are part of foreign buyouts. incidence by a fifth, duration by a third, and lowered labor income by seven percent (Columns 2, 5, and 8). The triple difference estimate (DiDiD) in Columns 3, 6, and 9 show statistically significant relative differences in unemployment incidence and annual labor income, but not in unemployment duration.
Concluding remarks
This article uses detailed registry data from Sweden to show that foreign buyouts have not affected workers' labor market outcomes. But domestic buyouts have increased unemployment incidence by a fifth, duration by a third, and lowered labor income by seven percent. These results do not lend support to the narrative that foreign PE firms destroy local jobs. The trends on the y-axis are estimated group-time effects from a regression that omits the constant and includes a set of control variables. The individual controls measured at t=0 are age, age squared, gender, labor income, education fixed effects, and tenure. We also control for match-specific dummies and five unemployment incidence dummies at time t=0, t=-1, t=-2, t=-3, and t=-4. We also include firm controls measured at t=0: size, size squared, size growth from t=-1 to t=0, firm age, firm age squared, and county fixed effects. Variable descriptions are available in Olsson and Tåg (2017) . Event time This table reports selected coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from nine different regressions. The regressions run on the Foreign and Domestic subsamples are difference-in-differences regressions, whereas the regressions on the combined sample (Both) are triple-difference regressions. Unemployment incidence is a dummy taking the value of one for workers with at least one day of unemployment during a year. "Post" is a dummy taking the value of one during the year of the buyout announcement and all years after. "Buyout" is a dummy taking the value of one for workers employed in targeted firms at time t=0. "Post x Buyout" is the difference-in-differences estimate and "DiDiD" refers to the triple difference coefficient. The regressions cover nine years, including four pre-periods, four post-periods, and the year of the buyout announcement. The model includes the same set of control variables as the normalized means in Figure 1 . The percentage change is the relevant coefficient divided by the average LHS variable for treated workers in the pre-period. The standard errors are clustered at the corporate group times municipality level. 
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